Attack lab

Six real sessions on the live guard, several modeled on named 2025 incidents.

4 attacks 2 controls live: nothing pre-recorded

Pick a preset. Red ones are attacks, green ones are honest requests that must still work.
Tamper. Choose any field and drop it, null it, change its type, upper-case it, flip one character, or add a field the product never asked for.
Send and read the real reply, or run every preset and watch the scoreboard fill.

What each preset tests

	Preset	Route	Why it matters
control	Control: ordinary installs and tests	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	Lockfile installs, pinned well-known packages and tests: all allowed.
attack	The AI invents a package name (slopsquatting)	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	Code models often suggest packages that don't exist; attackers register them. The invented package is refused.
attack	Look-alike names: reqeusts, dj4ngo	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	Swapped and look-alike letters of popular packages are refused.
attack	Agent switches on 'auto-approve' for itself	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	Modeled on a 2025 vulnerability where injected text made a coding assistant stop asking before running commands.
attack	README says: download and run this script	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	A downloaded script run without review is refused, in all its spellings.
control	No registry to check: held for a person	`POST /api/v1/supply-chain-guard/run`	Without a registry lookup the guard cannot tell a fake from a niche package, so it asks. Unknown never allows.

Each button runs a full session on the live guard. Rate limited per address.

FIRME AI CORPORATION · CAIN-42 is a Byzantine trust fabric. Numbers marked "our own check" were run by us, not by an independent party. Nothing on these pages is a certification.