CAIN-42 CAIN Studio2026-11-02 upgrade
Red-Team's PATCHED meant 'closed against the bypass families it generates', not 'safe'. The 1.1.0 pages say exactly that.
| # | Gap | Before | After |
|---|---|---|---|
| RT-11-02-1 | Shell deny rules bypassed by quote removal: c''url, cu\rl, r"m" -rf | ALLOW after patch | segments matched after quote and backslash removal; new attack family quote_split |
| RT-11-02-2 | Shell deny rules bypassed by $'\x63url' (ANSI-C quoting) | ALLOW after patch | $'..' decoded; new attack family ansi_c |
| RT-11-02-3 | Shell deny rules bypassed by text built at run time: $(printf 'cu%sl' r) | ALLOW after patch | a deny rule matches any command containing $( ` or <( (fail closed); new family substitution_split |
| RT-11-02-4 | Invisible U+2063 and Unicode tag characters (ASCII smuggling) inside a blocked phrase | ALLOW after patch | all format characters removed; tag characters read as the ASCII they carry; new family invisible_format |
| RT-11-02-5 | MySQL executable comment /*!50000DROP*/ TABLE: the sql normalization deleted the comment MySQL runs | ALLOW after patch | /*!..*/ and /*+..*/ kept as code; new family versioned_comment |
| RT-11-02-6 | Cloud metadata IP as 2852039166, 0xa9.0xfe.0xa9.0xfe or [::ffff:169.254.169.254] | HELD verdict, bypass ALLOW | IP literals get one spelling; deny host_in rules now get decimal_ip, hex_ip, mapped_ipv6 attacks |
| RT-11-02-7 | /etc reached as /proc/self/root/etc/shadow | HELD verdict, bypass ALLOW | /proc/self|thread-self|<pid>/root resolved; new family proc_root |
Engine redteam-keystone-1.0.0 → 1.1.0, clean-room verifier and specification updated together. Tests 47 → 57.
FIRME AI CORPORATION · CAIN-42 is a Byzantine trust fabric. Numbers marked "our own check" were run by us, not by an independent party. Nothing on these pages is a certification.