Reproduce the evidence.
No CAIN code required.
Download the signed E82 bundle, run the standalone verifier, and get the same result we did. 55 checks, one Merkle root, zero CAIN imports. Then sign an external attestation so the claim ledger can move from L1 to L2. You can be the first named external reproduction.
0. Check the download in your browser — no install
ZIP integrity check
After downloading the ZIP, select it here. Your browser computes SHA-256 locally; nothing is uploaded. Expected: 484f4dfe54cc83de618f3ff420427afacacb5a3201ae3309590435336e63096f.
Choose CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip…
1. Download
Evidence bundle
240 files, ~1.1 MB ZIP. Raw rows, model ledger, recovery records, gates, Merkle root, signature.
⬇ bundle.zipSHA256SUMSStandalone verifier
Python standard library + cryptography. No CAIN module. Recomputes the headline numbers from raw rows.
Manifest + key
The detached Ed25519 signature and public key. The key is self-generated; there is no independent witness yet.
MANIFEST.json.sigkeyNode.js verifier
No Python. Node 20+ built-ins only. 40 checks, same Merkle root. A second-language implementation.
⬇ verify_e82_node.mjsresultCI template
Drop this workflow into GitHub Actions and verify the bundle on every run.
verify-cain42.ymlAttestation kit
Sign a small JSON that records your environment, commands and result. This is what makes it external.
templateschemaattestation verifier2. Run it
Expected SHA-256 for the ZIP: 484f4dfe54cc83de618f3ff420427afacacb5a3201ae3309590435336e63096f
Linux · macOS · WSL
sha256sum CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip # expected: 484f4dfe54cc83de618f3ff420427afacacb5a3201ae3309590435336e63096f unzip CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip python3 -m pip install cryptography # or use a venv if your Python is externally managed python3 verify_e82_offline.py bundle | tee verifier-output.json
Windows PowerShell
Get-FileHash .\CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip -Algorithm SHA256 Expand-Archive .\CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip -DestinationPath . py -3 -m pip install cryptography py -3 .\verify_e82_offline.py .\bundle | Tee-Object verifier-output.json
One command (Linux / macOS)
curl -fsSLO https://cainstudio.online/proof/bundle/evolution-82-vertical-agi-2026-11-17/verify_live.sh sh verify_live.sh
One command (Windows PowerShell)
Invoke-WebRequest https://cainstudio.online/proof/bundle/evolution-82-vertical-agi-2026-11-17/verify_live.ps1 -OutFile verify_live.ps1 .\verify_live.ps1
Go (standard library only)
unzip -q CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip go run verify_e82.go bundle # expected: ok=true, 30/30 checks, same Merkle root
Node.js (no Python)
unzip -q CAIN42_E82_EVIDENCE_BUNDLE.zip node verify_e82_node.mjs bundle # expected: ok=true, 40/40 checks, same Merkle root
Clean container (different filesystem and Python)
docker build -f Dockerfile.verify -t cain-e82-verify . docker run --rm cain-e82-verify
⬇ Dockerfile.verify⬇ verify.sh⬇ verify.ps1
3. What you should see
| Check | Expected |
|---|---|
| Result | "ok": true |
| Checks | 55/55 |
| Merkle root | 63868034b46e901f2cec392cd25c22ab947516e594543e02155857a9c31c5ac9 |
| Signature | Ed25519 over the canonical manifest; public key 11Rdogd3q/uwkrCwHVRqodV5S6/VnLvhlopoS+1vaMo= |
| Recomputed | benchmark accuracy, collaboration accuracy, capacity calls, cross-host prefixes, gate counts, call counts |
| Tamper | modified, removed, added, reordered, truncated and re-signed mutations are rejected |
4. Clean-room results already recorded
We ran the verifier in python:3.11-slim, 3.12-slim, 3.13-slim and on the development replica in a fresh directory. Every run returned 55/55 and the same Merkle root. These are our runs — the external attestation is still yours to sign.
clean_room_reproduction.jsonDockerfile.verify
4b. Assurance beyond hashes
Integrity is not the whole claim. These are the adversarial and formal checks behind the boundary:
- 9/9 negative controls — remove any one of nine security checks and the attack executes; restore it and the attack is blocked.
- 3,000 Hypothesis attack cases — 5 property tests passed.
- 15/15 Z3 model properties — every negation unsat in the gate model.
- 3/3 real host reboot cycles — active mission, 20/20 tasks, 0 duplicates.
- 3/3 cross-host failovers — signed single-use authorization, 0 duplicates, stale writer refused.
- Full assurance report — negative controls, property tests, formal model, reboots, 6-hour status.
- Signed assurance manifest — 33 supplementary files, Merkle
bed98811…, FreeTSA timestamp.
5. Verify the external time anchor
The manifest hash is timestamped by FreeTSA under RFC 3161 at 2026-11-17T04:27:10Z (serial 0x0A149C12). This proves the manifest existed at that time. It does not prove correctness and is not an audit.
sh verify_timestamp.sh # expected: Verification: OK
⬇ MANIFEST.tsrtsa_verification.jsonverify_timestamp.sh
6. Record the external reproduction
Fill the template, sign canonical JSON with your own Ed25519 key, verify it with our standalone attestation verifier, and email the signed JSON. We publish valid attestations — including failures — and update the claim ledger.
python3 verify_external_attestation.py attestation.signed.json # expected: ok=true, evidence_class=EXTERNAL_ATTESTATION
⬇ attestation templateHow to sign itSubmit by email
Third-party audit: NOT PERFORMED · Independent witness cosignatures: 0 · External reproductions recorded: 0 · Target 2027: 3+. This page is a verification kit, not a certification.