CAIN-42 CAIN Studio

AGENTIC AI 75 · #19

Runtime agent quarantine

NVIDIA described Sentry as able to isolate agents attempting to exceed their permitted boundaries.

Last reviewed 2026-11-11

Agentic AI 75 / #19

LIVEMoat 7 · Autonomous Trust Control LoopBundle · Runtime Containment & EvidenceStream 3

2026 status: Vendor-reported platform capability · Category: Runtime containment

The 2026 development

NVIDIA described Sentry as able to isolate agents attempting to exceed their permitted boundaries.

The governance gap

Quarantine is only trustworthy if it is fast, cross-process and recorded. A quarantine that depends on the same process it is containing can be starved by that process.

Where CAIN-42 fits: Moat 7 — Autonomous Trust Control Loop

Core question: Can verified experience change future trust? Monitor, detect, contain, recover, and re-authorise from observed outcomes.

Contain the agent, not just the request: revoke capabilities, stop the fleet, preserve the evidence and require a human release. CAIN's quarantine and fleet-kill paths use a shared store so a second process can halt a runaway first process.

How the wiring works

  1. Detect the boundary breach from the decision path, not from the agent's self-report.
  2. Revoke the agent's outstanding capability tokens.
  3. Signal the fleet halt through the cross-process store and verify the halt.
  4. Preserve a signed containment receipt and require dual-key recovery.

What is real today

LIVE A public route in this deployment exercises this mechanism today, within its stated scope.

The public drill runs against a throwaway database and a demo agent. Sub-50ms halt is a design target measured in the drill, not a guarantee for every deployment.

Component in this repositoryWhat the module says it is
cain/quarantine.pyCAIN Trust Fabric - Autonomous Swarm Fleet Quarantine & Kill-Switch (Moat #2, #6 & #7)
cain/fleet_kill.pyCAIN-42 cross-host fleet kill switch (2026-11-10). Self-contained: Python stdlib + `cryptography`.
cain/argus/reauthorization.pyCAIN ARGUS — continuous re-authorization engine (Prompt 14, sections 8-9).
cain/execution_chain/capability.pyAttenuated, audience/destination-bound cross-system execution capability (Evolution 10, Phase 4).

Descriptions are the first line of each module's own docstring, read without importing it. A module path is a pointer into this repository, not a hosted endpoint. Its existence is checked by the test suite; its status for this use is the label above.

Check it yourself

Commercial package

OfferRuntime Containment Audit
BuyerSOC and agent-platform teams
Price (proposal)$2,500–$5,000 per audit; $1,500–$4,000/month retainer
BundleRuntime Containment & Evidence — Contain first, then prove what happened.
Operator streamStream 3 of the 10-stream operator playbook

SOC, incident response, compliance, enterprise IT is the bundle buyer. The entry offer for this bundle is Runtime containment review; signed evidence pack; the range is $2,500–$5,000 per review; $2,000–$10,000 per evidence pack. A price on this page is a proposal, not a validated rate, and no customer is claimed.

Buy this as a product or service

CAIN-A75-019 — Runtime Containment Audit DELIVERABLE

A bounded engine run on the buyer's sample: findings, a written report, and a SHA-256 artifact manifest. The manifest is unsigned: it is not a signature and not an attestation.

Kind: Retainer · Price (proposal): $2,500–$5,000 per audit; $1,500–$4,000/month retainer · Lead time: 5 business days.

Open the product page · all 75 products

What this page does not claim

What this page is not. CAIN-42 is not affiliated with, endorsed by, integrated into, or shipped with the organisation named in the 2026 item. The item is public context; the page describes how CAIN-42 would govern that class of capability. No page here claims a customer, a partnership, a certification, a patent, or a production integration. Prices are proposals. Built by a three-person team.

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