# Evolution 81 — Sandbox Report

## Technology

`bubblewrap` with new user/pid/uts/ipc/cgroup namespaces, a private network namespace, read-only
system binds, one writable workspace, all capabilities dropped, a cleared environment, and
RLIMIT_AS / RLIMIT_CPU / RLIMIT_FSIZE / RLIMIT_NOFILE / RLIMIT_NPROC with a hard wall-clock kill.

## Probe

| check | result |
|---|---|
| host_secret_unreadable | True |
| network_denied | True |
| ran_as_root_in_userns | True |
| system_read_only | True |
| workspace_writable | True |

- Egress: `blocked=True`
- Timeout: `{'elapsed_ms': 2005.7, 'exit_code': -9, 'killed_on_timeout': True}`
- Memory cap: `{'blocked': True, 'exit_code': 0, 'stdout': 'MEMORY_BLOCKED\n'}`

## Capabilities present / absent

`{"bubblewrap": true, "docker": true, "firecracker": false, "gvisor_runsc": false, "kata_runtime": false, "podman": false, "stronger_isolation_installed": false, "strongest_available": "bubblewrap", "user_namespaces": true}`

gVisor, Kata, Firecracker and Kubernetes Agent Sandbox are **not installed**. Stronger isolation is
not claimed. G21 is PASS for bubblewrap, with the stronger-isolation gap recorded.

## Limits

Process isolation on one host is not a VM boundary. A kernel exploit would defeat it. The sandbox
protects the host from ordinary agent code, not from a compromised kernel.
