{"run_id":"pr_dcbc06998f5d4edca244","created_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.403419+00:00","environment":{"python":"3.14.4","platform":"Linux-7.0.0-38-generic-x86_64-with-glibc2.43","deployment":"studio","fabric_enforce":"true","approval_enforce":"false","verify_enforce":"true","require_intent":"false","hostname":"unknown"},"results":[{"check_id":"fail-closed.unknown-never-allows","claim":"A stage that could not run never reads as permission.","category":"Fail-closed","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":"BLOCKED","detail":"an ENFORCING stage that could not run blocks (fail closed); only an advisory stage that could not run yields ALLOWED_DEGRADED (observed for advisory: ALLOWED_DEGRADED)","method":"Derive a verdict from a stage with verdict=unavailable and enforcing=true, using the same function the live path uses.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k degraded","limitations":"Checks the verdict function. A caller that ignores ALLOWED_DEGRADED can still proceed; strict mode in the SDK is what refuses it.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.162957+00:00","result_sha256":"86e24e9d37ddc0ee35c04692f426b25de9abb13a529422199ede4f9673331873"},{"check_id":"enforcement.denial-blocks","claim":"An enforcing denial blocks the action.","category":"Enforcement","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":"BLOCKED","detail":"an enforcing denial blocks","method":"derive_outcome with an enforcing deny.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k blocked","limitations":"Verdict derivation only; the gateway's action on `blocked` is covered by separate tests.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.163055+00:00","result_sha256":"2626d7174634449f95fa7a86ac2d382887d967f8201553edbb687bf760ec87d7"},{"check_id":"enforcement.shadow-does-not-block","claim":"In shadow mode the fabric records denials and blocks nothing.","category":"Enforcement","label":"SHADOW","passed":true,"observed":"ALLOWED_WITH_DENIALS","detail":"in shadow mode the denial is recorded and reported, and the call is not blocked -- deliberately, and visible in the verdict","method":"derive_outcome with enforce=false.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k shadow","limitations":"This is the DESIRED behaviour in shadow mode, not a security property. Labelled SHADOW so it is never read as 'protection is active'.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.163118+00:00","result_sha256":"e246413898b8483579b0cbfa9099df68dd90fda0a42781e660fe37cfc0735571"},{"check_id":"incident.kill-switch-overrides-shadow","claim":"The kill switch blocks even when the fabric is in shadow mode.","category":"Incident control","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":"BLOCKED","detail":"a halt blocks even with the fabric in shadow mode; a stop button that honours an observability setting is not one","method":"derive_outcome with enforce=false and halted=true.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k kill_switch","limitations":"Covers verdict derivation and the recorded halt flag.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.163154+00:00","result_sha256":"d0921f7d92581afc93220232106c157223391eea8a6ddc1b40dc36bcd36cbccf"},{"check_id":"chain.eleven-stages","claim":"Every consequential action is recorded across eleven stages.","category":"Traceability","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":["identity","intent","policy","authorization","risk","verification","actionproof","approval","mcpgate","execution","evidence"],"detail":"the canonical chain has 11 stages","method":"Read the canonical chain from the registry every surface derives from.","reproduce":"python3 -c \"import canonical; print(canonical.TRUST_CHAIN)\"","limitations":"Confirms the canonical definition. That live decisions actually carry all eleven is covered by test_clean_call_is_allowed_and_records_every_stage.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.163191+00:00","result_sha256":"aa7c0ce13228f670273a58c1967cfcb807a1a7e4bce9f6bd7dc569269b7bed8e"},{"check_id":"replay.approval-single-use","claim":"A granted approval can be spent exactly once.","category":"Replay protection","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"first_consume":true,"second_consume":false},"detail":"the second attempt to spend an approval fails, so a granted approval cannot be replayed","method":"Grant an approval, consume it twice against the real store.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k single_use","limitations":"Sequential, not concurrent. The atomicity guarantee comes from the UPDATE's WHERE clause and is covered separately.","duration_ms":4,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.167978+00:00","result_sha256":"756e5d012887e727ad875955ae3cba5c9b4e94b2d6a3baedc614a4c1ccfc2e85"},{"check_id":"authz.no-self-approval","claim":"A principal cannot approve its own held action.","category":"Authorization","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"refused":true,"status":403},"detail":"the requesting principal cannot approve its own request","method":"Request an approval, then attempt to resolve it as the requester.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k own_request","limitations":"Identity is the principal id; it does not prove two humans are involved, only two principals.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.168679+00:00","result_sha256":"26a05e88b3909c2834a23e58466f7b80a8cc961b0ce9a9a7cacaaf583c2a91fa"},{"check_id":"authz.stale-approvals-expire","claim":"A pending approval expires on its own.","category":"Authorization","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":"expired","detail":"a pending request past its deadline becomes expired on read, with no scheduler required","method":"Backdate a pending request's deadline and read it back.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k expire","limitations":"Expiry is evaluated on read; a request nobody reads stays pending in the table until it is.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.169304+00:00","result_sha256":"4d88608ef468c04e521647d1b9c1dcb2a2f294cc604742e1019fc7465eeda590"},{"check_id":"isolation.approvals-tenant-scoped","claim":"One tenant cannot read another tenant's approvals.","category":"Tenant isolation","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"visible_to_other_tenant":false},"detail":"another tenant reading a known id gets not-found, so ids cannot be probed for existence","method":"Create an approval in one tenant, read it as another.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k tenant_scoped","limitations":"Covers the approval surface. Decisions, evidence and events have their own isolation tests.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.169690+00:00","result_sha256":"0f3c20260bbab399b127672a45ca38fbd11bbd03875c377db39d514d7c400139"},{"check_id":"evidence.tamper-evident","claim":"An edit to a recorded decision is detectable.","category":"Evidence integrity","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"intact_before":true,"intact_after_edit":false},"detail":"editing a stored decision breaks its digest and the edit is detected","method":"Record a decision, verify its digest, edit the row, verify again.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_fabric.py -k tampered","limitations":"Tamper-EVIDENT, not tamper-proof. The digest is unkeyed: anyone able to write the row can recompute it. There is no append-only log and no external key.","duration_ms":1,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.171650+00:00","result_sha256":"e77914a280a849a6224c5ab6b6a8a4ba80ac1457f114f155a50e704db9ae8573"},{"check_id":"ssrf.webhook-targets-refused","claim":"Webhook targets on internal addresses are refused.","category":"SSRF","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"refused":5,"accepted":[]},"detail":"webhook targets on loopback, private ranges and the cloud metadata endpoint are refused before any request is made","method":"Submit loopback, private, link-local and non-HTTP URLs to the validator used at registration and before every delivery.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_webhooks.py -k refused","limitations":"DNS is resolved at check time. A name that resolves publicly here and privately elsewhere is handled by re-validating before each delivery attempt, not by this check.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.172121+00:00","result_sha256":"d200817bfa849fe25b01481007be2476b3948697416ccc8ac124e448d05aa594"},{"check_id":"crypto.webhook-signature-binds-timestamp","claim":"Webhook signatures cannot be replayed with a fresh timestamp.","category":"Cryptographic provenance","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"differs_with_timestamp":true},"detail":"the timestamp is inside the signed material, so a captured delivery cannot be replayed with a fresh header","method":"Sign identical bodies at two timestamps and compare.","reproduce":"pytest tests/test_webhooks.py -k timestamp","limitations":"HMAC with a shared secret stored in our database. It authenticates the sender to the receiver; it is not a signature a third party can verify independently.","duration_ms":0,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.172209+00:00","result_sha256":"e57e3c18f75cb78fcbde91bfa524903aabbacc0bab5fb69e9ab093cf38e04bbd"},{"check_id":"performance.decision-write-latency","claim":"Recording a decision is fast enough to sit on a request path.","category":"Performance","label":"VERIFIED","passed":true,"observed":{"samples":200,"p50_ms":0.432,"p95_ms":0.688,"p99_ms":44.544,"mean_ms":1.14},"detail":"evidence-write latency only: this measures recording a decision, NOT the end-to-end request path, which includes network, OPA and ActionProof","method":"200 sequential record_decision calls against the real store, reporting p50/p95/p99.","reproduce":"POST /proof/run and read performance.decision-write-latency","limitations":"Evidence-write latency ONLY. It excludes network, OPA, ActionProof and the proxied upstream, so it is a floor for end-to-end latency and must not be quoted as one.","duration_ms":231,"executed_at":"2026-11-03T00:54:06.403247+00:00","result_sha256":"fcbc0b7fed3e3d1ed5f16cf4985e19f0fa005838fddc00ca32df7499a47a3f5d"}],"passed":13,"failed":0,"total":13,"prev_hash":"ab7b1b3530bdc21eb1b5acd620689f1b42ebc712dbf3d2521b50d4cccce5ce06","run_hash":"b7f18d9d5be1ffc236dd96aeaf92f04a5c6f122eea7c3a60a7fd3100f3737d81","chain":{"runs":16,"intact":true,"problems":[],"guarantee":"tamper-evident","not":"tamper-proof. Whoever can write this table can recompute the chain. An external notary or an append-only store would be required for more, and neither exists here."},"labels_explained":{"VERIFIED":"executed just now, and passed","FAILED":"executed just now, and failed","HEURISTIC":"passed, but the mechanism is a rule of thumb","SHADOW":"recorded but not enforcing on this deployment","SIMULATED":"measured against a stand-in, not the real thing","UNVERIFIED":"not checked -- never render this as a pass","ERROR":"the check itself broke; not a pass"}}